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Abstract: Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we 
compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the 
answer to both of these questions is “yes”, but only in some instances, since these respective 
insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. 
When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be 
either incompetent as a knower or insincere as a teller. However, there are many instances 
where we reject testimony without making this negative evaluation of the speaker, and as 
such, without paying her an insult. Testimonial compliments are fewer in number, and are not 
constitutive of “everyday” testimonial exchanges, since, speakers who are competent as 
knowers and sincere as tellers are merely behaving correctly in accordance with the norms of 
testifying. Nevertheless, deferring to an authority on belief can be complimentary to that 
speaker if by doing so we judge her to have some mastery in a particular domain. Testimonial 
insults and compliments have important moral implications, particularly with regard to 
epistemic injustice and therapeutic trust. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a remark which has begun to attract some attention in the philosophy of testimony, G.E.M 
Anscombe once claimed that ‘It is an insult and it may be an injury not to be believed’ (1979: 
150). Her topic was the nature of believing another person, which she rightly claimed, at the 
time, was ‘a neglected topic in philosophical discussion’. Although the nature and 
epistemology of testimony has received a great deal of philosophical attention over the last 
few decades, still very little has been said concerning Anscombe’s remark about insult, 
outside of a few limited discussions.2 In this paper I defend a moderate position on 
Anscombe’s claim, according to which, I propose, there is such a phenomenon as a 
testimonial insult, but whether a hearer pays a speaker this insult with her lack of belief 
depends on the reasons one has for rejecting the testimony. A speaker is insulted when the 
                                                 
1 This is an uncorrected pre-print version. When citing please use the final journal version. 
2 For instance, Zagzebski (2012: 123-124) points to this remark of Anscombe’s, and also draws our 
attention to a similar claim by J. L. Austin: ‘If I have said I know or I promise, you insult me in a 
special way by refusing to accept it’ (1946: 171). Wanderer (2012) ties the concept of testimonial 
insult to epistemic injustice, and Hinchman (2005) argues that a speaker is ‘slighted’ if a hearer does 
not take herself to acquire a reason to believe p having been told p. Testimonial insult is also 
important for Goldberg’s (2015) discussion of the ethics of assertion, whilst Hazlett’s (forthcoming) 
account addresses the issue directly. 
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reasons for a hearer’s refusal are constituted by a negative judgment concerning the speaker’s 
competence as a knower, and/or her sincerity as a teller. Moreover, such insults will vary by 
degree, and it may be more appropriate to label some rejections of testimony as a slight or 
mild offense against the speaker, depending on the hearer’s negative evaluation. 
As a corollary of this account, a question remains over the symmetry of accepting 
testimony. Do we in some way compliment, commend or extol a speaker by believing her? In 
my brief assessment of this issue, I argue that this lacks the same intuitive pull that 
Anscombe’s claim about insult does because speakers involved in testimony are subject to 
certain norms which oblige them to speak the truth. To make a positive judgment of a speaker 
in this sense is merely to regard the speaker as having acted as she is expected to act – to have 
fulfilled her obligations as a speaker. It isn’t complimentary to judge someone as merely 
having fulfilled her obligations. Given this claim, we can see one way in which accepting and 
rejecting testimony are asymmetric to one another. Although this means that everyday 
instances of accepting testimony do not involve paying compliments, there are some 
exceptions, such deference to a speaker as an authority in a way that regards her as having 
mastery in a particular domain. 
My account begins with a brief discussion of the nature and value of testimonially 
acquired knowledge (§2), before directly discussing the nature of testimonial insult (§3). I 
then put this account to work by looking at the reasons we have for rejecting testimony, and 
which reasons manifest a negative, and hence insulting judgment of the speaker (§4). Finally, 
I provide a brief discussion of testimonial compliment (§5). 
 
2. KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY 
Knowledge has instrumental value to us both as individuals and as a collective society.3 
Indeed, many now say that we live in a knowledge economy. The more we know, the further 
we can advance the enterprises that make up our societies, and knowledge is valued at least to 
this extent. Now, it seems fair to say that most of what we know individually is acquired from 
testimony – from what other people tell us. Just note how many propositions you believe on 
the basis of another person’s testimony. Propositions about what’s happening in another part 
of the world, of history, scientific discovery, the contents of other minds, and your friends’ 
recent activities. Testimonial knowledge and belief is, then, ubiquitous (Coady 1992). Given 
that we allow ourselves to believe many of the propositions that people tell us, this suggests 
that we generally find speakers to reliably report what they know, otherwise we would be less 
disposed to believe them. Perhaps an appropriate analogy to capture both the value of 
knowledge and the ubiquity of testimonial exchange is that of being given the correct change 
in a shop by the cashier. We often hand over our money when shopping, but generally find 
that cashiers do not short change us, so we’re disposed to trust them with our money. The 
importance of this disposition to believe testimony will be made clear presently. First, 
though, to understand how knowledge transmission functions we need to look briefly at the 
speech act of assertion.  
                                                 
3 I am putting aside the interesting question of whether knowledge is more valuable than mere true 
belief (see Kvanvig 2003). Ultimately, if true belief is valuable, and knowledge is constituted by true 
belief, then knowledge is valuable – at least on parity of value with true belief. 
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 When we believe some proposition p, the primary means we have for expressing this 
belief to others is by asserting p. Assertion is one means we have for outwardly 
communicating those propositions that we inwardly judge to be true. Some accounts of 
assertion interpret this in terms of a commitment a speaker makes to the truth of p. For 
instance, John Searle says that the ‘purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit 
the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed 
proposition’ (1979: 12). Recognising the important role that assertion plays in the formation 
of beliefs in others, some argue that assertion should be understood to be governed by a 
particular rule which outlines when it is correct to make an assertion. Perhaps the most 
popular of these is the ‘knowledge norm’ of assertion (Williamson 2000), which states that 
one must assert p only if one knows p. Other attempts to formulate a norm of assertion have 
opted for a weaker epistemological constraint, namely, where knowledge may be substituted 
for either ‘justification’ (Lackey 2007; Kvanvig 2009), or ‘truth’ (Whiting 2015). These 
norms of assertion, like rules in a game, are constitutive, in that they define what it is to play 
that game. For instance, ‘the rule of chess that says you can’t castle if the king is in check is 
partially constitutive of the move of castling. A move that was not subject to this rule would 
not be castling’ (Macfarlane 2012: 84). As with rules in a game, we can satisfy a norm of 
assertion by, say, only asserting what we have sufficient justification to believe (on the 
justification norm), or break it, by asserting without sufficient justification. 
 I don’t intend to take a stand on what is the correct norm governing assertion, but to 
point out two things from these accounts that are relevant to my discussion here. First, if my 
earlier claim that hearers generally find speaker’s assertions to be true is accurate, then it 
should also be standard practice in our linguistic communication that speakers satisfy 
something like one of these assertion norms: speakers, on the whole, tend to satisfy these 
norms, and hearers expect speakers, all things being equal, to satisfy them. Thinking back to 
our cashier, we might equally expect her to satisfy some relevant norm to only give the 
correct change, which explains why her doing so is commonplace. The relevance of this 
observation will be made clear in §5 when we consider its application to our intuitions behind 
insult and compliment. Suffice it to say for now, though, that since it is commonplace, 
standard, or generally usual for speakers to satisfy one of these norms, and for hearers to 
accept speaker testimony, then it is to be expected that hearers accept speaker testimony, and 
unexpected that the hearers reject speaker testimony. This claim will play an important role in 
determining where hearers insult or compliment testifiers with their response to the 
testimony. 
 The second point to highlight is that assertion fulfils the function of transmitting 
knowledge in which a speaker offers something (knowledge) she perceives to be of value to a 
hearer.4 We still need, however, a specific subset of assertion to best capture the interpersonal 
relation of an offer of asset from one person to another. The problem with assertion in 
general is that, when asserting, a speaker needn’t have the intention to transmit her 
knowledge to a hearer. A person could go around making assertions without caring one bit 
                                                 
4 The speaker need not know the proposition for herself for it to be recognised as valuable. Lackey 
(2007) gives several examples of ‘selfless assertion’ where a speaker recognises that it’s ‘reasonable 
to believe’ p without herself believing p, and so asserts p given p’s potential value to the hearer(s). 
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whether anyone actually comes to believe her. To capture the notion of an offer of knowledge 
between persons, we need a specific kind of assertion that some writers have labelled 
‘telling’. With a telling, a speaker not only asserts p, but asserts p with the intention that her 
audience come to believe p. Elizabeth Fricker offers the following account of ‘assertoric 
tellings’:5 
In a paradigm and felicitous telling, the teller rightly takes herself to know that P, and 
seeks to share her knowledge with her intended audience, whom she believes 
ignorant, or possibly ignorant, as to whether P. Telling is the proprietary linguistic 
means…of letting someone else know what one already knows oneself…[and] is a 
social institution for the spreading of knowledge, enabling it to be possessed at 
second-hand. (Fricker 2006: 596) 
From this account we can see how telling borrows features from the general class of 
assertion, in that a teller takes herself to know (or have sufficient justification to believe) p. 
Importantly, too, telling is able to capture the exchange between speaker and hearer whereby 
a valuable item is offered from one person to another. Note that in Fricker’s description of a 
telling, the speaker assumes the ignorance of the hearer with respect to p, and hence her offer 
of p is to contribute an item to the hearer that she thinks he doesn’t already possess – an item 
of value, albeit one that is commonly exchanged. 
We now have a basic framework for understanding how knowledge – a valuable item 
– is transmitted from speaker to hearer through the assertoric speech act of telling, which I 
assume is governed by a constitutive norm that informs speakers of when it is permissible to 
perform the speech act. So, when a hearer rejects or accepts this testimony, does she imply 
any kind of insult or compliment, respectively, to the speaker? To answer this question, let’s 
begin by taking the issue of insulting by rejecting first. 
 
3. TESTIMONIAL INSULT 
In this section I will argue that a testimonial insult is paid from a hearer to a speaker when the 
hearer’s rejection of the speaker’s testimony embodies a negative evaluation of the speaker as 
either epistemically incompetent, insincere, or both. As such, this insult is not paid every time 
a speaker is disbelieved; rather, our negative judgments of speakers depend on the reasons we 
have for regarding the testimony to be false. It will be the task of §4 to show which reasons 
tend to be tracked by our testimonial insults. For now, I will explain in what two possible 
ways a testimonial insult can be paid. First, a hearer insults a speaker if she treats him as 
though he has failed to get to the truth of the proposition he takes himself to know, and has 
done so because he lacks credibility as an epistemic agent. When the hearer does this, we can 
say that she treats the speaker as an incompetent knower. Second, a hearer insults a speaker if 
she treats him as though his telling is insincere – that he is lying for some reason, usually 
either to deceive the hearer, or to make himself sound more knowledgeable than he really is. 
                                                 
5 Tellings can be a subset of other speech act types too. For instance, we can invent a fiction by telling 
fictional stories, reprimand by telling-off, make a promise by telling someone what we are committed 
to doing, and command by telling others what to do. I am only considering here those tellings that are 
assertoric.  
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When the hearer does this, we can say that she treats the speaker as an insincere teller. 
Taking each of these at a time, I will explain why it is an insult to be treated in either of these 
two ways. 
 
3.1. Incompetence as a Knower 
I argued in §2 that knowledge is a valuable asset we offer to others through testimony. Of 
course, in order to offer an item of value to another person, we must first possess the item, 
otherwise we offer something that doesn’t belong to us, or something we take to be of value, 
but that’s actually valueless. In the case of testimony, one specific reason why the hearer 
rejects what has been offered is due to the fact that the hearer does not believe the testimony 
qualifies as an item of knowledge, and hence, that she doesn’t ascribe the value to it that the 
hearer ascribes. But why should the speaker be troubled by this view that the hearer has of his 
testimony? Well, if the speaker believes himself to possess knowledge, then he takes himself 
to not only believe something that is true, but to have some form of justification for his belief. 
It is the justification that licences the speaker to regard his testimony as not merely a belief, 
but as knowledge, and hence, to be of value to other people. If a hearer rejects the testimony 
because she believes that the speaker has acquired his belief in an unjustified way, then this 
has implications for her view of the speaker’s ability to acquire epistemic goods – to get to 
the truth of the matter with some justification for his belief. Therein, I propose, an insult is 
paid to the speaker. The hearer implies that the speaker lacks competence in a fundamental 
area of human intellectual life. She implies that he has failed to attain knowledge with respect 
to his belief, and since the speaker takes himself to have knowledge – to have acquired his 
belief in a justified way – it is an insult to treat him as though he has not. To do so is to imply 
that he is incompetent as a knower with respect to this testimony – that the justification he 
takes his belief to have is no justification at all. 
 It is crucial to recognise that the insult is paid not merely in the rejection of something 
valuable, but in the reasons one has for rejecting the item. I can walk into a jewellery shop 
and be offered an expensive watch, but if I reject it because it’s too expensive, my rejection 
doesn’t imply that I think it’s valueless. Rather, my reasons for rejecting the watch are 
completely disconnected from my judgments concerning its value. Even when I am offered 
something for free, which is a closer analogy to testimony, my reasons still might not reflect 
my judgment concerning the item’s value. Suppose a friend offers me his advice and I reject 
it, not because I think his advice is valueless, but because I simply don’t have the time to hear 
him out properly. I don’t intend to imply that the advice has no value. However, if this had 
been my reason, then it might be considered a little insulting to him that I won’t hear him out. 
The same principle applies for testimony. If I see no value in the testimony because I think 
the testifier’s belief is not really knowledge, this has implications for my view of the 
testifier’s justification for her belief. If I see value in the testimony but just, for whatever 
reason, am not in the mood to hear it today, or am too busy to listen, this needn’t have 
negative implications for my judgment of the speaker. 
 A further contrast with a non-testimonial example will illustrate this point more 
clearly. Suppose you are a patient being treated in hospital (you represent the hearer). A 
doctor comes to your bedside to begin your treatment (he represents the speaker). He is 
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offering you his medical expertise as a means to help you regain your health (this represents 
the testimony – the valuable item offered to you). If you reject the doctor’s medical support 
because you think he is incompetent as a doctor, you appear to insult the doctor. This will be 
the case because doctors undergo extensive training to prepare themselves to be doctors, and 
their ability to practice and thrive in the profession depends upon their competence in 
applying this training effectively. Likewise, our ability to thrive in society depends on how 
well we hone our competence in forming beliefs with proper justification. If we fail in this 
respect, other people are not going to consider us credible testifiers, and we are not going to 
be able to make appropriately informed decisions. Just as the doctor is insulted when we 
refuse his help because we take him to be incompetent as a doctor, so the speaker is insulted 
when we imply his lack of competence as a knower. Now, if you reject my medical expertise 
because you regard me incompetent as a doctor you won’t have insulted me even one bit 
since I don’t take myself to have any medical expertise, and nor does my getting by in the 
world require me to have all that much. I do, though, rely heavily on my epistemic faculties, 
in which I must have confidence. In §4 I will introduce further examples to show where one’s 
reasons for taking the speaker to lack justification are insulting for the speaker. 
 I have described two separate, but connected aspects to the insult paid when treated as 
an incompetent knower: one social, the other personal. As I have been arguing, the sharing of 
knowledge through testimony is an interpersonal activity, and marks an important means by 
which we make social contributions. In his work on this issue, Allan Hazlett also connects it 
to insulting by refusing testimony. He says, 
Refusing someone’s testimony can manifest doubt about her credibility, which 
credibility she presupposed by telling you something in the first place. By refusing 
her testimony, in such a case, you reject her invitation to engage in a collective 
activity on the basis of doubt about her competence to engage in that activity. 
(Hazlett, forthcoming) 
Note that on this account it is the collective activity of knowledge sharing that we enter into, 
and desire to be effective in when we testify to others. I agree entirely with this description of 
the social aspect of testimonial insult. However, there is still a further issue, more personal to 
our ability to acquire knowledge, which is also relevant. We need true beliefs to get around in 
the world, and we must rely on our epistemic faculties to form beliefs that are true, with or 
without further reflection upon them. As Linda Zagzebski has claimed, we have ‘a natural 
desire for the truth’ and ‘a natural trust in the suitability of [our] faculties for getting the 
truth’ (2012: 36). If our faculties cannot be trusted, this would lead to bad consequences for 
us individually, in the same way as when a doctor cannot trust her skills as a doctor, negative 
results will follow. We certainly wouldn’t want to be told that what we take ourselves to be 
skilled at – what we need to have some ability in – we are in fact incompetent at, since then 
we cannot trust ourselves in that way. So, it is an insult to be treated as an incompetent 
knower since it both undermines our ability to contribute in a socially constructive way, and 
implies that we cannot trust our faculties to attain the truth with respect to the domain of 
testimony we take ourselves to be knowledgeable in. 
 
3.2. Insincerity as a Teller 
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What of those instances in which a hearer treats a speaker as an insincere teller? The structure 
of the insult is slightly different to the foregoing case since the hearer implies no lack of 
competence to the speaker in attaining truth, but rather in speaking truth. Since true beliefs 
are instrumentally valuable in guiding our practical decision making, they form an integral 
part of directing our actions according to our desires and intentions. However, if our beliefs 
are false, then they can mislead us into acting in a way counter to these desires and intentions. 
This can be damaging for individuals to varying degrees, and given this consequence, it looks 
like there can be something morally wrong about intentionally leading people to believe a 
falsehood.6 For instance, telling someone the wrong directions to the train station so that he 
will miss his train, or giving a political decision maker incorrect information so that she will 
action a policy that she wouldn’t have if the information had been accurate. In each case, the 
speaker deceives the hearer into believing something that isn’t true, and the hearer acts on the 
basis of this belief in a way that can be damaging for herself and for others.  
The insult here is fairly simple to identify. If a hearer treats a speaker as though he is 
attempting to intentionally deceive her – as though he is lying with his testimony – she may 
insult him by implying that he is performing a morally objectionable action. As with other 
immoral acts, it is offensive to accuse someone of performing one. So, it would be offensive 
to suggest that someone is a thief, or abusive, or racist, or a liar, even if it turns out that she is 
none of these things. As such, when we reject a speaker’s testimony, and do so because we 
take the speaker to be lying, we can insult the speaker by implying that she has acted 
immorally. This is what it means to insult the speaker by treating her as an insincere teller. 
 If my rejection of testimony embodies a negative judgment of the speaker in either of 
these two respects of epistemic incompetence or insincerity, must the speaker feel insulted, 
offended or slighted for the insult to take place? Providing that testimonial insults are 
sufficiently similar to other kinds of insult, then this doesn’t seem required. Consider, for 
example, members of a crowd at a sports event shouting racial epithets at one of the players. 
The player need not even hear the pejorative term for it to be used as an insult, and hence, the 
player needn’t feel insulted to have been insulted. Imagine, too, someone using offensive 
terms against you in a language you don’t understand. The language barrier will prevent you 
from feeling offended, and yet the insult has still been paid. I propose that testimonial insults 
work in the same way. They are purely the result of the hearer’s negative judgment on the 
speaker, and do not depend on the speaker’s awareness of the judgment. Of course, and as 
with other insults, if the recipient becomes aware of the insult, he or she may well be 
offended by it. 
 With this account of testimonial insult in place, let’s move now to look at how the 
insult is guided by the reasons we have for rejecting the testimony. 
 
4. WHEN IS IT INSULTING TO REJECT TESTIMONY? 
In this section I will put my account of testimonial insult to work by looking at three broad 
classes of reason we have for rejecting an item of testimony. I will refer to these three classes 
as defeater, inductive and prejudgement reasons. I begin with defeater reasons, which I 
                                                 
6 Though there are a few exceptions to this. For example, it may be morally right to intentionally 
mislead a murderer with wrong information. 
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propose are the main class of reasons that do not always involve paying an insult to the 
speaker.  
 
4.1. Defeater Reasons 
A testimonial rejection on the basis of defeater reasons occurs when a speaker S believes 
himself to know p, but where a hearer H possesses a defeater D for p – that is, H possesses a 
proposition that she justifiably believes – which conflicts with S’s testified proposition. The 
structure of a defeater reason, then, is this: S tells H that p, but H justifiably believes D which 
conflicts with p, and because of this, H rejects S’s testimony that p. Consider the following 
mundane example. Suppose you and a friend are planning to book tickets to see your 
favourite team play in a sporting event. He tells you, (p) ‘They are playing on the 7th 
September’. Your friend believes this because he went on the website yesterday and that was 
the date stated for when your team are playing at home. Unbeknown to him, though, they 
have since changed the date from the 7
th
 to 8
th
 September, and announced this on the website 
this morning. Having visited the site since the announcement, you have a defeater for your 
friend’s testimony, and refuse the testimony and tell him that he is wrong, and offer him this 
as your reason. Does your rejection amount to an insult in this case? Intuitively, it seems as 
though it doesn’t, since you would acknowledge that the speaker has not shown himself to be 
incompetent as a knower – he acquired his belief in a justified and responsible way. Nor is 
your friend intentionally trying to deceive you. In both regards, he has fulfilled his 
obligations as a testifier. In fact, at one point your friend did actually know p, but now things 
have changed and he no longer knows p. The problem for the speaker is just that you happen 
to have a defeater for his proposition that he is not aware of, and can hardly be blamed for not 
being aware of. As such, even though you reject his testimony, you pay him no insult since 
you don’t regard him as either an insincere teller or an incompetent knower.7 
 This same conclusion also carries over to less direct cases of testimony, such as 
scientific research. For instance, consider a nutritionist researching whether vitamin D2 or D3 
is more beneficial for healthy bones. She conducts her research with a sample size of 100, 
finds that D2 is more effective, and sends a paper with these results off to a nutrition journal. 
Concurrently, another study has been conducted that the nutritionist was not permitted access 
to for intellectual property reasons. The other study produces results from a sample size of 
1000 and finds, to the contrary, that D3 is more effective. The journal received the results 
from the two studies at the same time, and rejects the first nutritionist’s paper because of the 
conflicting results from this other study. The journal doesn’t insult the nutritionist by 
rejecting her testimony – she wasn’t permitted access to the other study, and she has 
conducted her research to the best of her ability. She has met her obligations to research 
responsibly, and isn’t attempting to mislead people. It just so happens that the journal has a 
defeating reason against her paper – that another study found a different result with stronger 
justification – and they reject the scientific testimony for that reason. 
                                                 
7 Although there is no data available to tell us which reasons people have for not believing speakers, I 
suggest that many, if not most reasons are due to these kinds of defeaters. The upshot of this, if it were 
true, is that many or most instances of testimonial rejection do not involve paying an insult to a 
speaker. 
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 Within this category of defeater reasons are an important class of cases in which we 
reject testimony due to the high stakes that it brings. For instance, a married man might reject 
the testimony of a friend which suggests that his wife is having an affair. Moreover, he might 
reject it because he insists that his friend is mistaken. Due to what is at stake here, it doesn’t 
seem plausible to insist that he is insulting his friend with his lack of belief. This is because 
the husband believes a conflicting proposition, say, ‘my wife would never cheat on me’, that 
works against the friend’s testimony,8 and hence, he needn’t make a negative judgment of his 
friend’s competence or sincerity. So, high-stakes cases can be accounted for within defeater 
reasons. 
 Are there cases of defeater reasons where an insult is paid to the speaker? Plausibly 
yes. Imagine a friend who sides with a political party whose leader is a disingenuous and 
shifty character. Even though you are both aware of this, and as such you have a defeater for 
the leader’s testimony, your friend is taken in by the things he says, gullibly believing many 
of the claims he makes to support his policies. Now your friend is reeling off “facts” and 
“statistics” to you, telling you to believe her testimony about them so that you will vote 
differently. You refuse to believe her, insisting that you think she’s been deceived. Your 
reasoning behind this is that she’s got her judgments all wrong on this politician, and he’s 
clearly just fabricating the facts for political gain. You imply that she’s failed to distinguish 
truth from lie, perhaps under the influence of persuasion and manipulation, and has displayed 
culpable failure of epistemic competence. Since she has a defeater for her beliefs – the 
evident dishonesty of the politician – you judge that your friend has self-deceptively put this 
aside to the point of irrationality, and this sounds offensive to some degree. And similar 
defeater cases apply too with other examples, say, with religious belief, in which religious 
testimony is rejected because the hearer takes herself and the speaker to possess a defeater for 
the testimony but one that the speaker has irrationally disregarded. This, too, sounds like an 
insult to the religious believer. 
Defeater cases like these also look insulting in the scientist example. Supposing that 
the nutrition journal rejects the nutritionist’s paper, not because they received a conflicting 
report from a different paper, but either because they think she has fabricated her results to be 
misleading, or because her methodology is poor, and so it’s likely to yield false results. This 
intuitively seems to be an insult paid from journal to scientist, and the reason why, I propose, 
is because it’s an insult to her to imply that she is flouting her obligation as a scientist to only 
publish what she has researched in a competent and responsible way, and to not lie about her 
findings.  
To summarise, my claim is that many instances of defeater reasons do not look to be 
insulting to the speaker. This is the case when the hearer recognises that the speaker is 
genuinely attempting to speak from knowledge. Where it looks like he isn’t, the hearer tacitly 
treats the speaker as though he has in some way violated his obligations to only assert what 
he knows, or has justification for, and does so through either insincerity or incompetence. 
Where a hearer treats a speaker in this way, she pays the speaker an insult.  
 
                                                 
8 This example only properly qualifies as a defeater as I am using the term if he has justification for 
believing it, which we could imagine that he does, say, from her previous behaviour and honesty. 
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4.2. Inductive Reasons 
The account of testimonial insult is able to explain our intuitions about cases involving other 
sorts of reasons for rejection as well. Where defeaters track reasons for rejecting the 
testimony p, other kinds of reasons trace our rejection of p to our judgment of the testifier.9 
Notably, when our reasons are inductively grounded – when they are based on our prior 
experience of the speaker – whether a testimonial insult is paid appears to be a much clearer 
issue. The structure of a testimonial rejection for inductive reasons is this: S tells H that p, but 
H rejects p because she has inductive grounds for believing S’s testimony to be false. 
There appears to me to be only two inductive reasons H would have for rejecting S’s 
testimony, and they each correlate to the two ways in which we can pay a testimonial insult. 
The first involves having inductive grounds for believing S to be an insincere testifier, and 
the second with being an incompetent knower. Let’s consider these in order with a few 
examples. Suppose your friend tells you that Einsteinium is a synthetic element, and this is 
not something you currently hold a belief about. You have previously been around him, 
though, when he has clearly made up certain claims to sound more intelligent, and not 
knowing whether this chemistry fact is true or false, you wonder whether he’s doing the same 
thing here. After all, Einsteinium does sound like it could be made up! You’re sceptical about 
your friend’s sincerity as a teller and so you reject his testimony. You don’t believe him, and 
instead decide to make up your own mind about this proposition. Your rejection marks a clear 
challenge to your friend’s sincerity, and he is insulted when you treat him this way. Even 
though what he says is true, you have some inductive grounds for thinking that he is lying in 
this instance, and your lack of belief reflects your view of him as an insincere teller.  
 What this implies, then, is that rejecting testimony for inductive reasons relating to a 
speaker’s sincerity is constituted by a testimonial insult. Perhaps, though, there are some 
cases where this claim seems too strong. What about ‘boy who cried wolf’ cases, or, say, an 
unreliable journalist who has a reputation for fabricating the truth to attract more attention. 
Isn’t there less intuitive pull to the claim that you insult these people by refusing to believe 
them? Well, if there is, two explanations for why are forthcoming. The first is to consider 
whether these people are even involved in the speech act of telling. Remember, the teller 
believes herself to rightly know p, or at least to have a good reason to believe p, but this 
might not be true for our two cases at hand. However, this strategy could be countered by 
simply replying that although the speaker does perform a telling, this speech act is 
infelicitous. She still testifies, and thus assertorically tells, but in an improper way, perhaps 
because she breaks some norm of assertion.  
A second approach, which I find to be more appealing, is to accept that it seems we 
don’t pay the same degree of insult to the journalist or the boy who cried wolf, but that we 
simply pay an insult to a lesser degree. In these cases, it may be more appropriate to say that 
we slight these testifiers by rejecting their testimony out of hand because it comes from a 
source commonly thought of as unreliable given the speaker’s prior insincerities. In effect, 
the testimonial insult remains the same in kind, but varies by degree. Other more moderate 
terms than outright insult might also be more appropriate to apply to one’s rejection of the 
                                                 
9 See Wanderer (2012: 165) for more on this distinction between believing a speaker and believing 
what the speaker says. 
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testimony, varying by degree given the hearer’s negative judgment. For instance, mild 
offense, disrespect, or impudence may be acceptable for more moderate degrees of insult. At 
the near-negligible end, one’s rejection of testimony may even be termed a testimonial 
discourtesy when still embodying a negative evaluation, but an especially mild one.  
 What about when our inductive reasons reflect on the speaker as an incompetent 
knower? Considering the Einsteinium example again, let’s suppose that your experience of 
the speaker is that he’s a sincere teller, but that his chemistry skills have much to be desired. 
You know he consistently scores low in chemistry and doesn’t really grasp many of the basic 
concepts. In virtue of these facts, you, again, decide not to believe the speaker, and to go 
away to make up your own mind. In this case, the hearer treats the speaker as though he’s 
failed to be a competent knower. Now, for all you are aware, your friend might be trying 
extremely hard to rectify his poor chemistry scores, and would be upset to find out that you 
won’t accept his testimony, even in spite of the fact that you are justified in rejecting it. The 
testimonial insult paid to the speaker here is clearly related to his perceived incompetence to 
obtain chemistry facts. Again, it may be too strong to term the negative evaluation of your 
friend an outright insult, but it certainly seems a little offensive or disrespectful. 
 
4.3. Prejudgement Reasons 
There is a third class of reasons for rejecting what we’re told that are worth considering 
which, like inductive reasons, are directed against the testifier, rather than simply at the 
testimony. I have in mind those instances in which a hearer rejects the testimony because of a 
prejudgment she has made about the speaker which is not based on any inductive evidence. 
This can involve negative prejudices, such as when the testimony of someone of a particular 
race, gender or other social identity is not believed because of their social identity. Although 
this is commonly linked with unjust prejudice, I avoid classifying all judgments of these 
kinds as prejudicial. This is because prejudice is a morally inflected term, and not all of these 
judgments are immoral, as will be shown in the ensuing. Due to this, I prefer the broader 
term, prejudgment, to mark this class of reasons. 
 To explain how these judgments work, I want to look at some of the leading work in 
this field developed by Miranda Fricker. She notes, first, that without any prior evidence of 
the testifier’s credibility, we must utilise stereotypical generalisations of the speaker as 
heuristic devices to determine the speaker’s trustworthiness: 
Barring a wealth of personal knowledge of the speaker as an individual…[a hearer’s] 
judgement of [the speaker’s] credibility must reflect some kind of social 
generalization about the epistemic trustworthiness—the competence and sincerity—
of people of the speaker's social type, so that it is inevitable (and desirable) that the 
hearer should spontaneously avail himself of the relevant generalizations in the 
shorthand form of (reliable) stereotypes. (Fricker 2007: 32) 
These stereotypes do not always work against the speaker. Fricker suggests the example of 
the family doctor, who, without having received her advice before, we are more likely to 
prejudge as a reliable testifier. What about where a negative stereotype does work against a 
speaker’s credibility? According to Fricker: 
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[I]f the stereotype embodies a prejudice that works against the speaker, then two 
things follow: there is an epistemic dysfunction in the exchange—the hearer makes an 
unduly deflated judgement of the speaker's credibility, perhaps missing out on 
knowledge as a result; and the hearer does something ethically bad—the speaker is 
wrongfully undermined in her capacity as a knower. (Fricker 2007: 17) 
When a hearer rejects testimony because of an unduly deflated judgment on the basis of the 
social identity of the speaker, Fricker refers to this as ‘epistemic injustice’. I propose that this 
also involves an insult to the speaker for, not only is the speaker undermined in her capacity 
as a knower, as Fricker suggests, but also as someone who only tells what she knows – as 
someone who is sincere and does not seek to intentionally mislead. When prejudiced against 
in this way, the speaker is not only treated as an incompetent knower, but may also be 
regarded as an insincere teller, depending on the view the hearer has of the speaker as a 
testifier. Any case involving social identity prejudice appears to treat the speaker in one or 
both of these ways when the testimony is rejected for these reasons.  
It’s worth highlighting that Fricker’s account connects the rejection of testimony to a 
missed opportunity to acquire a valuable item of knowledge, which is not only problematic 
for the hearer, but isolating for the speaker. In §2 and §3 I argued that testifying has an 
important social function since it is through testimony that we can make a valuable 
contribution of knowledge to society. When a speaker is undermined in this regard due to 
prejudice it suggests that what they take to be of value is in fact of no real value. This is an 
insult to the speaker and one that marks a clear case of epistemic injustice (see Wanderer 
2012). 
 Within this category of prejudgment also belong cases where we reject testimony out 
of hand, not for prejudicial reasons relating to social identity, but because of a particular view 
we have concerning the cognitive capacity of the testifier. Such examples include the 
testimony of young children, people with mental disorders and those who are heavily 
inebriated. Should we consider it insulting to a young child or toddler when we reject what 
they tell us? With these kinds of prejudgments, as with those of the inebriate and the mentally 
unwell, I suggest that, intuitively, they do not appear to involve an insult. As might be 
suspected by now, my explanation for this is because our rejection of this testimony is not 
constituted by a negative evaluation of the speaker as either insincere or incompetent. Rather, 
it seems that we simply aren’t disposed to treat speakers in these kinds of cases as sources of 
knowledge. In this sense, hearing the testimony of one of these speakers is often much like 
reading a fictional work. We don’t tend to take ourselves to be acquiring knowledge about the 
world when reading fiction, and as such, don’t take the author to be lying, or to be 
incompetent with her ability to form true beliefs. Since the author in a fiction is not involved 
in an assertoric telling, she is not under the same constraints as those who are, and in 
particular, her discourse is not governed by something akin to a knowledge norm of assertion. 
Plausibly, this same explanation can extend to our cases where the testifier has some form of 
cognitive capacity deficit. The speaker here is not thought to be a source of knowledge, and 
so is not, generally speaking, thought to be under any obligation to tell only what she knows. 
Perhaps the child or the inebriate is telling what she or he knows. However, if we simply 
reject the testimony out of hand because we don’t see the speaker in these instances to be a 
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source of knowledge, in much the same way as we regard the fiction writer, then we don’t 
imply anything negative about the speaker, and so, too, we don’t insult her. 
 This concludes my account of the predominant reasons we have for rejecting 
testimony, which has demonstrated in which instances we insult a speaker when not believing 
her. In this final section, I will consider the outstanding question concerning testimonial 
compliments. 
 
5. COMPLIMENTING BY ACCEPTING TESTIMONY? 
The overall framework I have given in addressing the issue of testimonial insult provides a 
basis for determining whether some form of compliment or commendation is paid to a 
speaker when we believe by accepting what she tells us. This claim appears to have less 
intuitive appeal to it than does the claim about insult. I will attempt to explain why this is the 
case, and defend the view that everyday instances of testimonial acceptance do not involve a 
compliment paid to a speaker, but offer some examples of where they do. 
I argued in §2 that our general disposition is to believe what speakers tell us since we 
find that speakers generally assert what they at least take themselves to know. Speakers tend 
to satisfy the norms governing testifying in much the same way as two players in a chess 
match tend to follow the rules of that game. Now, when players in a game break the rules it 
becomes clear that something has gone wrong, and the same is true when speakers break the 
norms of assertion. As such, when we refuse testimony, it indicates our belief that something 
has gone out of joint in the testimonial exchange – somewhere along the way, the speaker has 
done something unexpected by acting contrary to what ought to be done in these sorts of 
interactions. I have accounted for this in terms of a hearer’s judgment that a speaker does not 
really speak from knowledge. This response of the hearer’s sticks out to us, in a way, since 
the speaker, being involved in telling something she takes herself to know, has some 
underlying expectation that the hearer will believe her. Why shouldn’t she? After all, by 
asserting, the speaker takes herself to engage in an activity in which both hearer and speaker 
take the speaker to be asserting from presumed knowledge. So, even when the speaker is 
being deceptive, she may at least anticipate the hearer believer her. Returning to one analogy 
I drew earlier from a medical setting, it would seem odd or unusual for a patient to refuse the 
treatment of a particular doctor. Since we ought to trust medically qualified doctors, rejecting 
the doctor’s advice or support suggests something that’s out of place.  
This is perhaps why there is more intuitive pull to the idea that rejecting testimony 
involves some degree of insult than there is to the claim that accepting testimony involves 
paying a compliment. Our intuitions gravitate towards the former view because there appears 
to be something unusual, and therefore more explicit about refusing to believe someone. But 
when the converse circumstances hold, the intuition is nowhere near as strong. Do we 
compliment a person when we believe what he tells us? The analogies with testimony I have 
considered thus far advise against this claim. For instance, when we allow the doctor to treat 
us in hospital, it doesn’t appear that we pay the doctor some kind of compliment. Nor do we 
pay the chess player a compliment when we acknowledge that our opponent has made a 
correct move by using the pieces according to the rules of the game. This is explained by the 
fact that it is commonplace, or, to be expected, that we allow the doctor to treat us, so nothing 
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really sticks out in the exchange to suggest that our allowing this is complimentary.  
Furthermore, we allow him to treat us because we expect that he is qualified and able to treat 
us effectively. If he wasn’t then he wouldn’t have the job. He is merely fulfilling a 
requirement that he ought to fulfil anyway. This is also true of testimony: we are expected to 
satisfy certain normative requirements according to the norms of assertion. It sounds at least 
mildly condescending to be congratulated for doing something we are expected to achieve 
anyway. For instance, when moving the chess piece correctly, it would be quite unusual for 
one player to applaud the other for her ability to move the pieces according to the rules. She 
has simply done what she is required of her by the rules of the game. So, it doesn’t look like 
any compliment to a person to believe what she tells you – she is merely doing what is 
required of her to do. The converse is true of insult. It does look like an insult (in some cases) 
to refuse to believe someone – it implies that the speaker has failed to do what she is required 
to do. 
But that isn’t the end of the story for testimonial compliment. There do appear to be 
some rare instances in which we pay a compliment to a person with our belief. Suppose you 
regard someone as such a leading authority on a particular matter that you will only believe 
what she tells you concerning it. Although it might seem against common sense, for instance, 
to take seriously the possibility of multiverse theory, the very fact that Stephen Hawking is 
willing to entertain it would give many people reason to believe that it is true. 
Acknowledging someone as an authority in this way appears to be complimentary since it 
implies that the individual is not merely involved in fulfilling her obligations as an asserter, 
but has some mastery when it comes to a particular domain of inquiry. I suggest this is not 
unlike being only willing to receive medical treatment from a particular doctor because you 
think that she is the best at what she does. By requesting her specifically, she is 
complimented in the fact that you regard her as not merely adequate at her work, but to have 
a significant degree of expertise.  
I propose, then, that a testimonial compliment is paid when a hearer believes the 
testimony of a particular individual because she is an authority in a domain in which a high 
degree of expertise is required, and she is regarded to have mastery in it. This can have a 
positive impact on the speaker since our deference to another’s authority might inspire that 
person to live up to her position of influence. If we are willing to place our trust in a speaker 
in this way, then hopefully the person will respond with heightened trustworthiness. This idea 
is related to the concept of ‘therapeutic trust’, which Karen Jones described as ‘trust 
undertaken with the aim of bringing about trustworthiness’ (2004: 5). She gives an example 
of a mother who entrusts her house to her daughter for the weekend with this particular aim 
in mind: ‘The mother might think that by displaying her trust and not arranging to have the 
daughter stay at a friend's house or to have the neighbours keep an eye on the place, she can 
elicit trust-responsiveness in her daughter’. With respect to testimony, in deferring to 
someone’s authority, we can hopefully encourage the cultivation of her trustworthiness as a 
reliable source of knowledge. Providing our deference to authorities can elicit trustworthiness 
therapeutically, this gives us a reason to endorse such a practice. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
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I have suggested one positive consequence that might follow if our deference to authority is 
complimentary for a speaker. This should give us some motivation to believe the testimony 
of certain people. I leave it open as to whether the fact that we pay testimonial insults with 
our lack of belief should motivate us to want to believe or disbelieve certain people. I expect 
that this issue will have implications for a number of interpersonal relationships, especially 
among friends and spouses. However, this ethical question will need to be explored 
elsewhere. My purposes here were simply to articulate the nature of testimonial insult and 
compliment, and see where these interactions are paid. Identifying all of the relevant 
applications of this account remains a further task.10 
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